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Abstract
We show how aggregation of information in general equilibrium can resolve the exchange rate determination
puzzle. Unlike macro DGE models, which enrich tastes or technology, we enrich the information structure.
Unlike micro-based models, our model connects dispersed information to the macroeconomic variables that
anchor traditional analysis. Results relevant to the determination puzzle include: (1) persistent gaps between
exchange rates and fundamentals, (2) excess volatility relative to fundamentals, (3) exchange rate movements
without macro news, (4) little or no exchange rate movement when macro news occurs, and (5) a structural-
economic resolution of the "order ﬂow puzzle"–that macro variables cannot account for monthly exchange
rate changes, whereas transaction ﬂows can. Calibration results match the empirical ﬁndings of Meese and
Rogoﬀ (1983).
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Two new approaches to exchange rates emerged in the 1990s, both micro-founded. This paper addresses
whether connecting them can resolve the most researched puzzle in international macroeconomics–that
macro fundamentals do not explain monthly exchange rate changes (the determination puzzle; see Meese
and Rogoﬀ 1983). The two new approaches are the dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) approach and the
microstructure approach.2 DGE modeling introduces rich preference structures and production structures,
but has not yet ventured beyond common-knowledge information structures (e.g., toward information that
originates in a dispersed form). The microstructure approach focuses explicitly on richer information struc-
tures, at the cost of relying on stylized, partial equilibrium analysis (e.g., informative signals are introduced
without links to deep economic fundamentals, and without considering that the fundamentals themselves are
determined by the signals received, through real allocation choices). The "new micro" approach we propose
here connects the two by embedding a micro process of information aggregation into a macro DGE setting.
The driving force behind the exchange rate in our model is productivity. Though not necessary, anchoring
exchange rates with a real variable shows that information dynamics are not special to ﬁnancial transactions
and the associated nominal variables. (The information approach produces broadly similar results when
instead focused on shocks to nominal variables like money demand, or to other real variables.) The essential
ingredient is that individuals’ currency trades are more correlated with unobserved shocks to home-country
productivity than with shocks to foreign productivity. Consider an economy in which bits of information
about realized productivity are initially present at the micro level, i.e., at the level of individual ﬁrms. None
of these ﬁrms considers itself to have superior information. But if the currency trades of individual ﬁrms are
correlated with their own micro-level productivities (e.g., due to increased export revenues), then aggregated
trades initiated by home agents convey incremental information about the home shock. This information
structure diﬀerentiates our model from the DGE macro literature. Beyond this, the macro features are quite
standard, in fact rather streamlined.
The micro features of the model relate closely to micro models of asset trade. In these models, ﬁnancial
intermediaries act as marketmakers who provide two-way prices. We introduce liquidity provision of this
type by assuming that all agents engage in both consumption and marketmaking.3 This consolidates the
activities of households with that of ﬁnancial institutions in a way similar to the “yeoman farmer” consol-
idation of consumption and production decisions in the new-macro branch of DGE models (i.e., individual
agents, or households, engage in both consumption and production in those models). The consolidation
greatly facilitates integration of the microstructure and DGE approaches.4 In particular, it ensures that the
2DGE examples include Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995,1998), and Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan (2002), among many others. Microstructure analysis, particularly its hallmark use of signed transaction quantities,
includes Lyons (1995), Rime (2001), Evans (2002), Evans and Lyons (2002a), Hau, Killeen, and Moore (2002), Bjonnes and
Rime (2003), and Payne (2003), among many others.
3Note the emphasis here on liquidity provision that is private, in contrast to the public provision of liquidity (in the form of
central banks) at the center of the monetary approach to exchange rates.
4To non-macro readers, this type of consolidation is surely unfamiliar. The assumption facilitates general equilibrium
analysis because the agent population remains deﬁned over a single continuum, and diﬀerences along that continuum arise as
1objectives of ﬁnancial-market participants are aligned with those of consumers. All trading is therefore con-
sistent with expected utility maximization; noise traders, behavioral traders, and other non-rational agent
types are absent. The resulting ﬁnancial markets are semi-strong form eﬃcient (reﬂect all public informa-
tion), but not strong form eﬃcient: the endogenous pace of aggregation cannot keep up with the evolution
of fundamentals.
The model shows that richer, more realistic information structures produce an exchange rate that aligns
closely with empirical facts. For the determination puzzle in particular, relevant results include: (1) persistent
gaps between exchange rates and fundamentals, (2) excess volatility relative to fundamentals, (3) exchange
rate movements without macro news, and (4) little or no exchange rate movement when macro news occurs.
Intuition for these results is as follows. Persistent gaps between exchange rates and fundamentals arise
because the underlying state of fundamentals–which corresponds to the union of all information sets–is
revealed only gradually. Excess volatility occurs because real allocations are distorted by rational exchange
rate errors–an “embedding eﬀect”; these distorted real allocations induce additional volatility in exchange
rates.5 (Note that past micro models cannot produce excess volatility from this source since they do not
permit feedback from information and exchange rates back to real fundamentals.) Exchange rates move
without macro news because microeconomic actions–in particular, trades–convey information, even when
public macro news is not present. There may be no impact on exchange rates from macro news if prior
microeconomic aggregation of information renders that news redundant.
We explore the model’s empirical implications with numerical simulations. These simulations reveal two
important features: First, exchange rates are disconnected from fundamentals over monthly horizons. We
show, for example, that Meese-Rogoﬀ style regressions would have almost no explanatory power. Not only
can this explain the Meese-Rogoﬀ results, it does so in a way consistent with the empirical literature linking
order ﬂow and exchange rates (see footnote 2). Second, the presence of the “embedding eﬀect” makes the
empirical link between exchange rates and fundamentals appear only at horizons that are far longer than
the horizon at which past states of the economy are publicly known. For example, fundamentals account
for only 50% of the variance in exchange rates at the two year horizon, and 75% at the ﬁve year horizon
(consistent with empirical work, such as that in Mark 1995).
This paper belongs to a recent literature that addresses why exchange rates are well explained by signed
transaction ﬂows (e.g., 40 to 80 percent of daily changes explained, for a host of major currencies; see Evans
and Lyons 2002a,b). Our model shows why signed transaction ﬂows should have more explanatory power
than macro variables: in a setting of dispersed information, aggregated transaction ﬂows provide a stronger
signal of current and expected future changes in macro fundamentals than lagged macro variables do. The
parsimoniously as possible to capture the model’s essential features.
5For further intuition on embedding, recognize that the exchange rate, as an asset price, is free to jump, whereas real
variables (like total output) are not. Suppose home agents over-estimate real ouput and consume too much today (resulting
in part from an overvalued real exchange rate). The following period the exchange rate must depreciate from its over-valued
level, not only enough to reduce consumption to reﬂect lower-than-expected output, but also to compensate for the distorted
consumption decision last period.
2model of Hau and Rey (2002) goes a diﬀerent route in addressing the empirical signiﬁcance of transaction
ﬂows. Their focus for understanding currency movements is on shocks to cross-country equity returns and
the resulting ﬂows into less-than-perfectly-elastic currency markets. No information aggregation takes place
in their model. A more relevant paper along this theoretical line is Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2003),
which does explicitly address how transaction ﬂows relate to information aggregation. Unlike our DGE
setting, theirs is a model based on rational expectations equilibrium (in the spirit of Grossman and Stiglitz
1980). An important ﬁnding is that greater dispersion of information can lead to greater price impact from
non-fundamental trades (from rational confusion between fundamental and non-fundamental trades). They
too generate simulation results that broadly match the empirical ﬁndings of Meese and Rogoﬀ (1983).
Though our model includes private information, it should not be interpreted as "inside" information
in the sense that one or a few insiders have large information advantages (and know it). The dispersed
information we have in mind in fact characterizes most variables at the center of exchange rate modeling,
such as output, money demand, inﬂation, consumption preferences, and risk preferences. These variables
are not realized at the macro level, but rather ﬁrst as dispersed micro realizations, and only later aggregated
by markets and/or governments.6 For some of these measures, such as risk preferences and money demands,
government aggregations of the underlying micro-level shocks do not exist, leaving the full task of aggregation
to markets. For other variables, government aggregations exist, but publication lags underlying realizations
by 1-4 months, leaving room for market-based aggregation in advance of publication.
Methodologically, the DGE environment we study has the following novel features. First, ﬁnancial
markets in our model are incomplete, which, among other things, makes room for the exchange rate to be
determined from more than just the marginal rate of substitution between home and foreign consumption
goods (see also Duarte and Stockman 2001). In particular, the exchange rate is pinned down by expectations
via a present-value relation in a manner familiar to the asset approach. Second, the model embeds social
learning: agents learn from the equilibrium actions of others. Third, the presence of social learning means
that we need to solve each agent’s decision problem and inference problem jointly. More concretely, the
solution begins with a conjecture about each agent’s information set, and concludes with veriﬁcation that
these conjectured information sets line up with information provided by market outcomes. Fourth, our
solution accounts for agent risk aversion. Risks associated with incomplete knowledge about the economy’s
state inﬂuence consumption and trading decisions (which, in turn, aﬀect inferences agents draw from market
outcomes). To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper to solve a DGE model with this combination of risk-
averse decision-making, heterogeneous information, and social learning.
Section 1 presents the model’s basic characteristics. Section 2 provides model details. Section 3 speciﬁes
the steps involved in solving for equilibrium. Sections 4 and 5 study the equilibrium, with focus on pricing
dynamics at both high frequencies and low. Section 6 concludes. An appendix presents analytical detail.
6Our information speciﬁcation abstracts from strategic behavior. Strategic interaction is important for understanding col-
lapsing ﬁxed exchange rates (see, e.g., Corsetti et al. 2001), but not the everyday functioning of major ﬂoating-rate currencies.
31 Theoretical Overview
Our genre of information model identiﬁes primitive shocks and their propagation in ways that partial-
equilibrium models cannot. There are three essential ingredients: (1) speciﬁcation of an endowment process
(or production technology) for dispersed information, (2) speciﬁcation of the information available for ﬁnan-
cial pricing, and (3) a solution methodology that maps individual information sets into equilibrium actions
that, once observed, support those individual information sets. The model below is one set of choices in
these three dimensions. Other options are indicated so that those with diﬀerent modeling preferences have
a sense of the wider possibilities.
The ﬁrst of these essential ingredients–speciﬁcation of dispersed information–is a qualitative departure
from existing DGE work in macro. The focus here is on price eﬀects from information that persist, not on
“microstructure eﬀects” (by the latter we mean price eﬀects that are transitory, e.g., from marketmaker risk
management or from bouncing between bid and ask prices); from a macro perspective, microstructure eﬀects
of this kind are second order. Though the dispersed information that drives the exchange rate in our model
is productivity, as noted, this need not be the case. Other key features of open-macro modeling like sticky
goods prices and imperfectly competitive ﬁrms can be introduced in the usual way. Our macro structure is
streamlined to highlight the information dimension.
The second essential ingredient is that modeling liquidity provision needs to take a stand on information
sets: what information do agents have when setting transactable prices? The genre of models we work with
here relaxes the common assumption of "strong-form informational interdependence"–where actions at any
given time are conditioned on information aggregated from all other actions occurring at that same time (see,
e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz 1980). When simultaneous actions are informationally interdependent in this way,
resulting transaction quantities convey no information that is not already embedded in the transaction price;
there is no learning from order ﬂow ex post, and indeed, there is no information content in transaction ﬂows
whatsoever (both counterfactual).7 In the model below, we choose instead a “simultaneous trade” design
(see, e.g., Lyons 1997). Under this design, trades at any point in time occur simultaneously throughout the
economy, but realizations cannot be conditioned on one another (a standard assumption within the class of
simultaneous-move games in game theory). One cannot condition on information revealed by the trading
intentions of every other agent at the time one chooses to trade, save doing one’s best to forecast them.
We ﬁnd this an inherently realistic assumption. Though a convenient way to relax the assumption of trades
being strong-form information interdependent, it is not the only possibility. For example, an intermediate
road would be to assume that ﬁnancial transactions at any “point” in time are executed sequentially (à
la Glosten and Milgrom 1985). In this case, the earlier the trade in the sequence, the more limited the
7Another unfortunate feature of Walrasian mechanisms is that agents generally do not take positions that they intend in
the future to liquidate (because all trades are conditioned on all concurrent trading information). Among other things, this
produces counterfactual predictions about how liquidity is provided in ﬁnancial markets: transitory position-taking is a deep
property of liquidity provision, and is important for understanding how trade quantities (i.e., realized order ﬂow) map into price
changes.
4conditioning information (because early trades cannot condition on information conveyed by later trades).
This alternative produces a constraint on information sets that is qualitatively similar to the one we employ
here.
The third essential ingredient of this modeling genre is its solution methodology, which needs to map
individual information sets into equilibrium actions, and then back to information sets. Here we adopt
a guess-and-verify method with the following 5 steps, the ﬁrst and last of which sharply distinguish our
information-theoretic approach from past DGE modeling. In step 1, we make a conjecture about the infor-
mation available to agents at each point in time. This involves specifying agents’ information endowments
as well as what they learn by observing trading outcomes. Based on this information structure, in step 2 we
guess the form of the equilibrium pricing rules for spot rates. In step 3, we solve for optimal consumption
and portfolio allocations (based on analytic approximation methods in Campbell and Viceira 2002). Step
4v e r i ﬁes that agent choices for consumption, investment, and currency holdings clear markets. In step 5,
we verify that the conjectured information structure from step 1 can be supported by an inference problem
based on endowment information and information from trading (the latter includes both prices and order
ﬂows).
A fourth ingredient of our model below is that consumers and ﬁnancial liquidity providers are con-
solidated. This is not an essential ingredient. Whereas new-macro DGE models focus on richer micro-
foundations on the economy’s supply side, hence their consolidation of consumers with producers, our focus
is instead on richer micro-foundations in ﬁnancial price determination. This consolidation serves three main
purposes. First, it consolidates budget constraints across the two sets of activities, which simpliﬁes the
analytics. Second, it ensures that messy incentive misalignments do not arise (e.g., there are no agency
problems). Third, it ensures that the preferences of liquidity providers are in no sense special, as is often
the case in partial-equilibrium microstructure modeling. We recognize that for some questions it will be
necessary to drop this fourth, non-essential ingredient.
Finally, we note that currency trades in the model are quite general, in the sense that they include all
three of the fundamental motivations addressed in the literature: a transactions motive (e.g., for purchasing





The world is populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived agents indexed by z ∈ [0,1] who are evenly split
between the home country (i.e., for z ∈ [0,1/2)) and foreign country (z ∈ [1/2,1]).F o r c o n c r e t e n e s s , w e






iU(Ct+i,z, ˆ Ct+i,z) (1)
where 0 <β<1 is the discount factor, and U(.) is a concave sub-utility function, which we specialize to log
(which exhibits constant relative risk aversion, CRRA):
U( ˆ Ct,z,C t,z)=1
2 ln ˆ Ct,z + 1
2 lnCt,z.
All agents have identical preferences over the consumption of US goods Ct,z and UK goods ˆ Ct,z. Et,z denotes
expectations conditioned on agent z’s information set at time t, Ωt,z. Et denotes expectations conditioned
on common time-t information (i.e., Ωt ≡∩ z∈[0,1]Ωt,z).
2.1.2 Timing
Decision-making in the model takes place at two frequencies. Consumption-savings decisions take place at a
lower frequency than ﬁnancial decision-making (where the latter includes determination of asset prices and
reallocation of portfolios via trading). To implement this idea, we split each “month” t into four periods
(see Figure 1). Consumption-savings decisions are made “monthly,” while ﬁnancial decisions are made
periodically within the month. As will become clear, the use of the term “month” is nothing more than a
convenient label: the economic intuition developed by the model is exactly the same if we replaced “month”
t by some other consumption-relevant period. That said, let us now describe the structure of the model by
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Figure 1: Model Timing
Period 1 (Quoting): Agents begin the month with holdings in three assets: dollar deposits B1
t,z,p o u n d
sterling deposits ˆ B1
t,z, and domestic capital (Kt,z for US agents and ˆ Kt,z for UK agents). Each agent then
quotes a spot price S1
t,z ($/£) at which he is willing to buy or sell pound deposits in exchange for dollar
deposits. (Exchanging pound deposits for dollar deposits are the model’s currency trades. Note too that the
absence of money in this economy means that these deposits are best viewed as real deposits.) Quotes are
6observable to all agents.8
Period 2 (Trading): Each agent z chooses the amount of pounds (i.e., deposits) T 2
t,z that he wishes to
purchase (negative values for sales) by initiating a trade with other agents. The sum of these signed trade
quantities across all agents z is what we shall refer to as the period’s order flow. Trading is simultaneous,
trading with multiple partners is feasible, and trades are divided equally among agents oﬀering the same
quote. (That trades are divided equally is important: in equilibrium it will imply that all agents receive the
same incoming order-ﬂow realization.) Once these transactions have taken place, agent z’s deposits at the














t,z∗ denotes the incoming foreign currency orders, in total, from other agents trading at z’s quoted
price. S1
t is the period-1 spot rate quote at which z purchases pounds (so S1
t T2
t,z∗ is the dollar deposits
received for having sold T2
t,z∗ pound deposits in response to the incoming order). In equilibrium, this will
be the spot rate quoted by all agents (i.e., S1
t = S1
t,z ) for reasons we explain below. Notice that period-3
currency holdings depend not only on the transactions initiated by z, (i.e., T2
t,z) but also on the transactions
initiated by other agents T2
t,z∗. An important assumption of our model is that the choice of T2
t,z by agent z
cannot be conditioned on the incoming orders T2
t,z∗ because period-2 trading takes place simultaneously (save
for doing one’s best to forecast T2
t,z∗). Consequently, though agents target their desired allocation across
dollar and pound assets, resulting allocations include a stochastic component from the arrival of unexpected
orders from others.
Period 3 (Quoting): All agents again quote a spot price and also a pair of one-month interest rates for
dollar and pound deposits.9 The spot quote, S3
t,z, is good for a purchase or sale of pounds, while the interest
rates, Rt,z and ˆ Rt,z indicate the rates at which the agent is willing to borrow or lend one-month in dollars
and pounds, respectively. (Later, we use Rk
t+1 and ˆ Rk
t+1 to denote the one-month returns on US and UK
real capital, respectively.) As in period 1, all quotes are publicly observable.
P e r i o d4( T r a d i n ga n dR e a lD e c i s i o n s ) : In period 4, agents choose a second round of foreign currency
8It will be clear below that consumers in this model have both speculative and non-speculative motives for trading (the
non-speculative motive arising from the need to facilitate periodic consumption and investment). That the speculative motive
is not the only motive obviates concern about so-called "no trade" results (i.e., the theorem proposed by Milgrom and Stokey
1982, that if I know that your only motive for trade with me is superior information, then I would never want to trade with
y o ua ta n yp r i c ea tw h i c hy o uw a n tt ot r a d e ) .
9Deposit rates are only quoted in period 3 to keep the structure of the model as simple as possible. Allowing interest to
accrue on intra-month deposits, based on rates quoted period 1, would not materially aﬀect our results. In particular, the
existence of period-1 deposit rate quotes would not aﬀect the trading decisions and inference problems facing agents in period
2, which lie at the heart of our analysis.
7purchases (if there remain motives for further intra-month trade).10 They also choose their real allocations:
consumption of US and UK goods and real investment expenditures. After US agents z have chosen their
consumption of US and UK goods, Ct,z and ˆ Ct,z, their foreign currency purchases T4
t,z, and their real





t,z − It,z + S3
t T4
t,z∗ + Ct,z∗), (2)
ˆ B1
t+1,z = ˆ Rt( ˆ B3
t,z + T4
t,z − ˆ Ct,z − T4
t,z∗) (3)
where Rt and ˆ Rt are the dollar and pound interest rates (gross) that are quoted by all agents in period 3 of
month t (in equilibrium, Rt,z = Rt and ˆ Rt,z = ˆ Rt for all z, as shown below). As in period 2 trading, actual
deposit holdings following period-4 trading also depend on the actions of other agents. In particular, total
incoming orders for foreign currency T4
t,z∗ and total incoming orders for US goods Ct,z∗ aﬀect the deposit
levels in the ﬁrst period of the following month. Notice, for example, that B1
t+1,z is augmented by Ct,z∗:




1/2 Ct,zdz, (common to all US agents; z<1/2), and an idiosyncratic component, νt,z, with
R 1









t+1,z = ˆ Rt( ˆ B3
t,z + T4
t,z − ˆ It,z − T4
t,z∗ + ˆ Ct,z∗). (5)





an idiosyncratic component, ˆ νt,z, with
R 1/2
0 ˆ νt,zdz =0 .
Finally, we turn to the dynamics of the capital stocks, which are central in our model for determining
equilibrium exchange rates. The production of US and UK goods at the start of month t +1 , Yt+1,z and
ˆ Yt+1,z,i sg i v e nb y :
Yt+1,z = At+1 (Kt,z − Ct,z − Ct,z∗ + It,z),
ˆ Yt+1,z = ˆ At+1( ˆ Kt,z − ˆ Ct,z − ˆ Ct,z∗ + ˆ It,z),
where At+1 and ˆ At+1 capture US and UK productivity. Note our convention: Kt,z is the real capital stock at
10That motives for further currency trade within the month will indeed remain is one of the model’s important properties
(established below in Section 4). It addresses the question of why agents would want to trade at such high frequencies.
11We have to make an assumption about the distribution of the incoming export orders Ct,z∗ in the same sense that we had
to make an assumption about the distribution of incoming foreign exchange trades T2
t,z∗.F o r T2
t,z∗, we assumed that trades
are divided equally among agents oﬀering the same price. (This is conservative, informationally, since it maximizes the trading
information available to each.) For exports, a more decentralized market, it is perhaps more natural to allow for idiosyncratic
noise. This noise will not, however, slow down the pace of information revelation: as we shall see, in equilibrium agents will
precisely infer the state of world productivity after period-4 trading without needing an additional signal from the real product
markets.
8the beginning of month t, so that the term in parenthesis is the capital stock at the end of month t, i.e., after
period 4 trading and consumption. These production functions lead to the following capital accumulation
equations:
Kt+1,z = Rk
t+1 (Kt,z − Ct,z − Ct,z∗ + It,z), (6)
ˆ Kt+1,z = ˆ Rk
t+1( ˆ Kt,z − ˆ Ct,z − ˆ Ct,z∗ + ˆ It,z), (7)
where Rk
t+1 ≡ 1+At+1, and ˆ Rk
t+1 ≡ 1+ ˆ At+1 denote the one-month returns on US and UK capital.
(Depreciation is zero in both countries.) Equation (6) describes how US consumers’ holdings of capital
evolve; equation (7) describes the dynamics of UK consumers’ holdings.
2.1.3 Productivity and the Information Structure
Our model becomes explicitly "international" with the speciﬁcation of relative productivity, the driving force
behind the exchange rate. The key feature that diﬀerentiates US from UK agents is that each agent type
is better informed about the productivity of home ﬁrms than foreign ﬁrms. (This could result, for example,
through direct observation of the productivity realization for one’s own ﬁrm.) As a result, agents in diﬀerent
countries do not share the same expectation about current and future returns to real capital. Below we
examine how this dispersed information is impounded in exchange rates and interest rates via trading. Our
focus is thus on the process of information transmission, not so much on the speciﬁc type of underlying
information. The analysis can be extended to include dispersed information about alternative underlying
information types.
The exogenous productivity processes are expressed here in terms of log returns on real capital. Though




t = r + ut + et + θ(et−1 − ˆ et−1), (8a)
ln ˆ Rk
t ≡ ˆ rk
t = r +ˆ ut +ˆ et + θ(ˆ et−1 − et−1). (8b)
We assume that the ut, ˆ ut,e t,a n dˆ et are normally distributed mean-zero shocks. The ut and ˆ ut shocks have
a common variance σ2
u and the et and ˆ et shocks have a common variance σ2
e. We allow for the possibility of
non-zero covariance between the ut and ˆ ut shocks:
Cov[ut, ˆ ut]=ρσ2
u
For tractability, we assume that the et and ˆ et shocks are independently distributed.
Our speciﬁcation for log capital returns includes two random components beyond the constant r:a
transitory component ut (ˆ ut) and a persistent component et (ˆ et). The transitory component ut (ˆ ut)i sa
9one-month eﬀect on US (UK) returns with cross-country correlation ρ. Unlike ut (ˆ ut), the random variable
et (ˆ et) is contemporaneously independent across countries, but gives rise to an intertemporal impact that
depends on this component’s cross-country diﬀerential from the previous period. It should be clear from these
two productivity processes that their diﬀerential, i.e., rk
t − ˆ rk
t , follows a simple MA(1) process. This greatly
facilitates analysis of the diﬀerential as a driving force (richer processes for this diﬀerential get technically
diﬃcult quickly). Though not intended as precise empirical representations, we consider it uncontroversial
that capital returns should include both transitory and persistent components.
In most of the analysis below we examine information structures in which for each month t, all US agents
observe in period 1 their home shocks {ut,e t}, whereas all UK agents observe their home shocks {ˆ ut, ˆ et}.12
Dispersed information thus exists inter-nationally, but not intra-nationally. This speciﬁcation highlights the
theoretical consequences of dispersed information in the simplest possible way. (In the version of the model
that we calibrate, we include information that is dispersed both internationally and intra-nationally.) The
timing structure depicted in Figure 1 is also motivated by the desire for analytical clarity. At the heart of
our analysis is the following question: Can dispersed information about the month t state of productivity
be completely aggregated via trading and hence reﬂected in exchange rates and interest rates before real
allocation decisions are made? In our timing structure, this boils down to the question of whether information
aggregation is complete by the start of period 3. Periods 1 and 2 are in this sense a metaphor for the many
rounds of quoting and trading that facilitate information aggregation in actual markets before real allocation
decisions are made.13 We oﬀset the dampening eﬀect that this structure has on revelation by making actions
(trades) observable, which is much more transparency than is present in actual markets. Allowing for fewer
trading periods with greater transparency enables us to examine the process of information aggregation in
ac l e a ry e tm e a n i n g f u lw a y .
2.2 Decision-Making
Agents make two types of decisions: consumption-savings decisions and ﬁnancial decisions (quoting and
trading). The former are familiar from standard macro models, but the latter are new. By quoting spot
prices and interest rates at which they stand ready to trade, agents are taking on the liquidity-providing
role of ﬁnancial intermediaries. Speciﬁcally, the quote problem facing agents in periods 1 and 3 is identical
to that facing a marketmaker in a simultaneous trading model (see, for example, Lyons 1997, Rime 2001,
Evans and Lyons 2002a). We therefore draw on this literature to determine how quotes are set.
Equilibrium quotes are derived as a Nash equilibrium with the following two properties: (i) they are
consistent with market clearing, and (ii) they are a function of public information only. Though the latter
property is not necessary for the information transmission role of transaction ﬂows, it is still important
12This is not the same as assuming two representative consumers: two consumers would interact strategically (a rather
implausible notion here), whereas in our continuum consumers are perfectly competitive.
13For an example of a model with timing structure along these lines, see Evans and Lyons (2004).
10for this role, so let us address it more fully. With this property, the information in unanticipated ﬂow
can only be impounded into price after it is realized and publicly observed. This lies at the opposite pole
of the information assumptions underlying Walrasian mechanisms (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980 being an
example) in which the market price at a given time impounds information in every trade occurring at that
time. The Walrasian mechanism is akin to assuming that all trades are conditioned on one another. This is
obviously counter-factual in most markets, and certainly so in FX.14 As noted in the previous section, what
is really necessary for the transmission role of transaction ﬂow is that market prices do not impound all of
the information in concurrent executed transactions. This is insured in our model by an assumption that
marketmakers cannot condition their price quotes on the concurrent trading intentions of all other agents.
This aspect of the model can be viewed as taking seriously the information constraints that price-setters
actually face.
We should stress, though, that quotes being conditioned only on public information in our model is a
result, not an assumption. Put diﬀerently, we make other assumptions that are suﬃcient for this outcome
(drawing from the simultaneous-trade references above). Those assumptions are (1) that actions within any
given quoting or trading period are simultaneous, (2) that quotes are a single price good for any size, and (3)
that trading with multiple marketmakers is feasible.15 The resulting solution to the quote problem facing




t,w h e r eS
j
t is a function of public information Ω
j
t
(determined below). Similarly, the period-3 interest rate quotes are given by Rt,z = Rt and ˆ Rt,z = ˆ Rt,
where Rt and ˆ Rt are functions of Ω3
t (recall that interest rates are set by liquidity-providing marketmakers
here, not by a central bank). To understand why these quotes represent a Nash equilibrium, consider a
marketmaker who is pondering whether to depart from this public-information price by quoting a weighted
average of public information and his own individual information. Any price that deviates from other prices
would attract pure arbitrage trade ﬂows, and therefore could not possibly represent an equilibrium. Instead,
it is optimal for marketmakers to quote the same price as others (which means the price is necessarily
conditioned on public information), and then exploit their individual information by initiating trades at
other marketmakers’ prices. (In some models, marketmakers can only establish desired positions by setting
price to attract incoming trades, which is not the case here since they always have the option of initiating
outgoing trades.)
14Even if the FX market were organized as a centralized auction with full transparency, this would not be not suﬃcient
for Walrasian-type aggregation: it would also have to be true that in equilibrium all agents would actually choose to trade
simultaneously (so that each could condition on the price eﬀects of others’ trades). In any case, actual FX markets are not
centralized auctions, but rather decentralized dealer markets with trade transparency that is is relatively low.
15The assumption of no spreads is not necessary, though it greatly facilitates the analytics. Speciﬁcally, the economics of the
model would not be signiﬁcantly changed if each trader-consumer’s quote were a schedule of prices, one for each incoming order
quantity from minus inﬁnity to plus inﬁnity, so long as that schedule is conditioned only on the incoming order, as opposed to
the realization of all other orders in the market (i.e., the quoting trader would in this way be able to protect against adverse
selection in the single incoming trade). To go this route, we would have to relax the assumption that trades are split equally
across marketmakers, since, as noted, equal splits means that everybody is receiving their share of the marketwide aggregate
order. Alternatively, marketmakers could charge one another an unconditional, ﬁxed commission on incoming orders. The
existence of this commission would create an incentive to quote beyond the reciprocity requirement we impose, but would not
aﬀect the equilibrium we analyze since all agents are marketmakers (and the marketmaker problems are symmetric, so the
redistribution is nil).
11Next we turn to the consumption and portfolio choices made in periods 2 and 4. Let W
j
t,z denote the
wealth of individual z at the beginning of period j in month t. This comprises the value of home and foreign











t,z + Kt,z + S3
t ˆ Kt,z
Notice that wealth is valued in dollars using the equilibrium spot rate quoted in the period before trading
takes place.16
In period 2 agents initiate transactions (i.e., choose T2
t,z) to allocate wealth optimally between dollar and
pound assets. Because trading takes place simultaneously, however, the choice of T2
t,z cannot be conditioned
on the orders they simultaneously receive from others, T2
t,z∗.O fc o u r s e ,i nc h o o s i n gT 2
t,z agents do their best
to forecast T2
t,z∗, but they cannot condition on its realization. We denote this forecast of the incoming order
as E2
t,zT2
t,z∗.( H e r e a f t e rw eu s eE
j
t,z to denote expectations conditioned on information available to individual





t,z) denote the value functions for agent z at the beginning of periods 2 and 4.
T2






















































T h ec h o i c ev a r i a b l eλt,z is key. It identiﬁes the target fraction of wealth agents wish to hold within the




t,z are determined from the optimal choice of λt,z given E2
t,zT2
t,z∗, ˆ B1
t,z + ˆ Kt,z,a n dW2
t,z.)
H3
t,z identiﬁes the within-month return on wealth (i.e., between periods 1 and 3). This depends on the rate
of appreciation in the pound and the actual faction of wealth held in foreign deposits at the end of period-2
16No single agent can hold both Kt,z and ˆ Kt,z since agents hold domestic real capital only; thus, depending on whether z is
above or below 1/2, one of these two terms in each equation will equal zero.
12trading. The latter term is λt,z−ξt,z,w h e r eξt,z represents the position-eﬀect of unexpected incoming pound
orders from other agents (a shock). This means that the return on wealth, H3
t,z, is subject to two sources
of uncertainty: uncertainty about the future spot rate S3
t , and uncertainty about order ﬂow in the form of
trades initiated by other agents T2
t,z∗.
In period 4, agents choose consumption of US and UK goods, foreign currency orders, and investment
expenditures. Let αt,z and γt,z denote the desired, cross-month fractions of wealth (weights) held in pounds
and domestic capital respectively:
αt,z ≡
S3

















⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩










The period-4 problem can now be written as:
J4
z(W4
t,z)= m a x
{Ct,z, ˆ Ct,z,αt,z,γt,z}
n
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t+1 ≡ 1+At+1 and ˆ Rk
t+1 ≡ 1+ ˆ At+1.
H1
t+1,z is the excess return on wealth (measured relative to the dollar one-month interest rate Rt). As






t,z represents the eﬀects of unexpected currency orders that arise from period-4
trading. Monthly returns also depend on the fraction of wealth held in real capital. For the US case this is






t,z identiﬁes the eﬀects of unexpected demand for US
goods (i.e. US exports).17 In the UK case, the fraction is γt,z −ˆ ζt,z, where ˆ ζt,z ≡
³





Monthly returns are therefore subject to four sources of uncertainty: uncertainty about future spot rates
17When superior information about home-country income is not symmetrized by month’s end, one manifestation of the
residual uncertainty is a shock to export demand.
13(i.e., S1
t+1,w h i c ha ﬀects deposit returns); uncertainty about future productivity (which aﬀects real capital
returns); uncertainty about incoming currency orders; and uncertainty about export demand.
The ﬁrst-order conditions governing consumption and portfolio choice (i.e., Ct,z, ˆ Ct,z,λ t,z,α t,z) take the
same form for both US and UK agents:



































t Rt − 1
´i
, (16)
where Vt,z ≡ dJ4
z(W4
t,z)/dW4
t,z is the marginal utility of wealth. The ﬁrst-order conditions governing real
investment (i.e. γt,z) diﬀer between US and UK agents and are given by:


























To further characterize the form of optimal consumption, portfolio and investment decisions, we need to









In a standard macro model where agents provide no liquidity provision, equations (15) through (19) together
imply that Vt,z = Uc( ˆ Ct,z,C t,z). The ﬁrst-order conditions can then be rewritten in familiar form using the
marginal rate of substitution. This is not generally the case in our model. As we shall show, the marginal
utility of wealth Vt,z can diverge from the marginal utility of consumption because unexpected currency and
export orders aﬀect portfolio returns.
2.3 Market Clearing
Market clearing in the currency market requires that the dollar value of pound orders initiated equals the








for j = {2,4}.
We assume that dollar and pound deposits are in zero net supply, so that aggregate deposit holdings at












t,zdz =0 . (21)
Combining these conditions with the budget constraints for dollar and pound deposits implies that
R
It,zdz =
R ˆ It,zdz =0 , so that aggregate real investment expenditures must equal zero if the deposit and goods markets
are to clear. This does not imply that the investment expenditures of individual agents are zero. The
appendix shows that each agent chooses real investment expenditures to oﬀset the eﬀects of the idiosyncratic
component of last month’s export shock. This is achieved via trading in domestic deposits. (For example,
recipients of positive idiosyncratic export shocks last month will undertake more real investment this month
by selling domestic deposits to the recipients of negative idiosyncratic export shocks–the latter being happy
with a lower level of real investment.) Of course, this form of trading has no impact on the aggregate
level of investment expenditure; it simply allows expenditures to be redistributed among agents. Aggregate
expenditure could only vary if there were a change in aggregate deposit holdings, an implication that is
inconsistent with market clearing. As a consequence, the aggregate capital stock available for production
after period-4 trading is complete is
R
(Kt,z − Ct,z)dz in the US and
R ³
ˆ Kt,z − ˆ Ct,z
´
dz in the UK. Each
capital stock is augmented by production that takes place between month t and t +1 , so that the stock of

















where Kt ≡ 1
2
R
Kt,zdz and ˆ Kt ≡ 1
2
R ˆ Kt,zdz. These equations summarize the implications of market clearing
for the dynamics of the aggregate capital stocks.
3 Solving for Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this model is described by: (i) a set of quote functions that clear markets given the
consumption, investment, and portfolio choices of agents; and (ii) a set of consumption, investment, and
portfolio rules that maximize expected utility given spot rates, interest rates, and exogenous productivity.
In this section we describe how the equilibrium is constructed.
We solve for equilibrium using a guess-and-verify method. This includes the following ﬁve steps, the ﬁrst
and last of which distinguish our information approach quite sharply from other DGE macro modeling:
1. Information Conjecture: We make a conjecture about information available to agents at each point
in time. This involves specifying what information agents receive directly and what they learn by
observing trading.
152. Quote Decisions: Based on this information structure, we then guess the form of equilibrium quote
functions for spot rates and interest rates (periods 1 and 3).
3. Allocation Decisions: We use log linearized ﬁrst-order conditions and the budget constraint to approx-
imate agents’ optimal consumption, investment, and currency choices given the spot and interest rates
from step 2.
4. Market Clearing: We check that agent choices for consumption, investment, and currency holdings
clear markets.
5. Information Conjecture Veriﬁed: We verify that the conjectured information structure (from step 1)
can be supported by an inference problem based on exogenous information available to each agent, and
their observations of quotes and trading activity.
As suggested in the previous section, capital stock dynamics are at the center of the model’s equilibrium.
Capital dynamics are approximated from the market-clearing conditions in (22) and (23):
kt+1 − kt ∼ = rk











ˆ kt+1 − ˆ kt ∼ = ˆ rk











where δt,z is the log consumption/wealth ratio:
δt,z ≡ ct,z − w4
t,z − ln(µ/2)
and µ is twice the unlogged consumption/wealth ratio in steady state (overbar denotes steady-state value):
µ ≡ 2 ¯ Ct,z/ ¯ W4
t,z.
In deriving these equations for capital dynamics, we have assumed that deposit holdings always represent
a small fraction of agent wealth. This condition is met trivially in the steady state because both US and
UK agents hold all their wealth in the form of domestic capital. The accuracy of these approximations
deteriorates when away from the steady state if agents accumulate substantial ﬁnancial assets/liabilities
relative to their capital holdings.
4 Exchange Rate Dynamics
Given that productivity is the forcing variable, exchange rate dynamics will depend on how dispersed pro-
ductivity information is embedded in spot rates. Recall that the processes for log capital returns in the US
16and UK, respectively, follow:
rk
t = r + ut + et + θ(et−1 − ˆ et−1),
ˆ rk
t = r +ˆ ut +ˆ et + θ(ˆ et−1 − et−1),
where we allow the transitory components ut and ˆ ut have correlation ρ, but the persistent components et
and ˆ et are independent across countries (for tractability). Recall also that we assumed in section 2 that
information about the return on capital arrives as follows:
1. US Shocks: US agents all observe the realization of their home shocks {ut,e t} at t:1,
2. UK Shocks: UK agents all observe the realization of their home shocks {ˆ ut, ˆ et} at t:1,
where the shorthand t:j denotes period j in month t.
The following propositions characterize the exchange rate process implied by this information structure.
They clarify the model’s essential features, including the central role of endogenous information revelation.
Proposition 1 (Spot Rates) The log nominal exchange rate implied by spot quotes in periods 1 and







where the operator ∇ denotes the diﬀerence between US and UK values (e.g., ∇kt = kt − ˆ kt).
Thus, spot rates in each of the two price-setting periods are pinned down by the log capital-stock dif-
ferential, where expectations are conditioned on common information, Ω
j
t = {1,3}. To develop intuition for
this result, ﬁrst note that markets here are incomplete, so that unlike complete-markets models, the spot
rate is not determined by the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption across US and UK goods.18 Rather,
the spot rate is pinned down by the international distribution of wealth, which here means the international
distribution of capital. This can be seen by combining the deﬁnitions of the realized capital shares γt,z −ζt,z
(see the deﬁnition of H1
















18The nature of market incompleteness is somewhat novel in this model, so we discuss it in some detail in the working paper
version (Evans and Lyons 2004a). Even if agents could hold foreign real capital, ﬁnancial markets here would still be incomplete:
the deeper source of incompleteness is that dispersed information precludes a full set of state-contingent claims.
17The ratio of US to UK wealth is proportional to the ratio of US to UK capital, with the proportionality
factor that depends on the ratio of realized capital shares. In equilibrium, changes in the wealth ratio are
highly correlated with changes in the capital ratio because allocation choices (i.e., γt,z) are determined by
expected excess returns that are comparatively stable. This means that any equilibrium restrictions on the
distribution of wealth will have their counterpart on the distribution of capital. One such restriction is that
the wealth of each consumer remains positive (i.e., Wi
t,z > 0 for i = {2,4}), or equivalently, that log wealth
remains bounded. In equilibrium, order ﬂows aggregate dispersed information about productivity because
consumers have an incentive to trade based on their individual information. This process of social learning
is crucial to the equilibrium (see Propositions 3 and 4 below), but it breaks down if the wealth of either US
or UK consumers falls to zero. (For example, if W2
t,US =0 , then there is no period-2 order ﬂow that can
convey dispersed information about US productivity shocks, ut and et.) This bound on log wealth ties down
















Equation (29) identiﬁes the unique value for the spot rate that places Kt/S3
t ˆ Kt on an expected future
path consistent with the equilibrium bound on log wealth. To see why, consider what would happen if the
expected t +1return on US capital rose relative to the return on UK capital, with no change in current or
future spot rates. This change in returns would raise the expected ratio of US to UK capital in t +1 .I t
would also lower Wt+1,UK/Kt+1 and raise Wt+1,US/S3
t+1 ˆ Kt+1, thereby reducing US exports and raising UK
exports (relative to domestic capital). These wealth eﬀects induce a self-perpetuating cycle of higher growth
in US capital and lower growth in UK capital from t+1onwards (see equations 22 and 23). And, as a result,
Kt/S3
t ˆ Kt would rise without bound and W4
t,UK would be driven to zero. This outcome can be avoided only
if the current spot rate is raised to oﬀset the eﬀects of higher returns on the distribution of capital in t +1 .
The present value term in equation (29) shows the extent to which the current spot rate must be raised
to oﬀset the eﬀects of future return diﬀerentials, such that the international distribution of log capital and
wealth remain bounded.
The quote equations of Proposition 1 follow in a straightforward manner from (29). The equilibrium
dynamics of spot rates insure that expected future returns on US and UK capital are equal (when expressed
in terms of a common currency). Under these circumstances, the present value term disappears from (29),
leaving s3
t = E3
t∇kt as shown in equation (28). Period-1 spot rate quotes are set so that expected intra-month





t∇kt as in equation (27).
Proposition 1 identiﬁes the diﬀerent factors that contribute to the dynamics of spot rates. In particular,
19This property of the equilibrium arises from the absence of hedging terms in the period-2 portfolio choices (see appendix
for further details).

































These equations show how changing expectations about the distribution of capital and the return on capital
contribute to spot rate dynamics. Speciﬁcally, equation (30) shows that across months the revision in spot






t ]. The second component is proportional to the current estimate (conditional on
Ω1
t) of the last month’s error in estimating the distribution of capital, ∇kt−1−E3
t−1∇kt−1. The within-month







t conveys what agents
learn about capital returns during the current month. The second term identiﬁes what they learned during
the current month about last month’s error in estimating the distribution of capital.
Equations (30) and (31) clarify how exchange rates are driven by the arrival of information. In particular,
common-knowledge information and its evolution through time are key to understanding the contribution
of the various components of spot-rate adjustment. We now study this evolution in detail.
Proposition 2 (Revelation Special Case) Immediate revelation of new information about the month-
t state of the economy occurs only when ρ = −1.
Recall that US (UK) agents learn the values of et and ut (ˆ et and ˆ ut) at the start of period 1 in month t,
with Cov[ut, ˆ ut]=ρσ2
u. Although all four shocks contribute to the current diﬀerence in capital returns, ∇rk
t ,
they cannot aﬀect the spot rate until they become common knowledge. In the special case where ρ = −1,
both ut and ˆ ut are immediately common knowledge, leading to their full impounding in quotes immediately
in period 1 via E1
t∇rk
t in (30). When ρ>−1, however, none of the dispersed information about current
returns is immediately common knowledge, so none of the new information about the state of the economy
is reﬂected in the period-1 spot rate (despite the information existing in dispersed form).20
Proposition 3 addresses the general case, clarifying the degree to which period-2 trading contributes to
learning.




t,zdz denote aggregate order ﬂow toward
pounds in period-2 trading. In equilibrium, aggregate order ﬂow augments the common-knowledge information







. In the special case where ρ = −1,∇et ∈ Ω3
t. For
20Of course, when ρ=1 the same is true, but in this case there is not even a change in the relative value of ut and ˆ ut, i.e., no
change in this fundamental to be revealed.

















t−1 is the scaled innovation to period-2 order ﬂow (relative to Ω2
t) that
depends on all four return shocks:
ξt ∼ = ξe∇et + ξu∇ut. (33)











= πe∇et + πu∇ut, (34)
where πe =( 1− ψξe) 6=0and πu =( 1− ψξu) 6=0 .
This proposition shows the pace at which period-2 trading aggregates dispersed information. (Coeﬃcient
values are in the appendix.) Period-2 order ﬂow is informative because s3
t − s1
t is forecastable based on
agents’ individual information, Ω2
t,z. Hence, each agent has an incentive to trade, and in so doing, some of
their individual information is revealed to others via order ﬂow. When ρ = −1, the innovation in order ﬂow
is a function of et and ˆ et. This means that each agent can infer the value of ∇et from incoming order ﬂow
and their individual information. Under these circumstances, dispersed information concerning et and ˆ et
becomes common knowledge after a single trading period. The key to this result is that with ρ = −1,t h e
values of et and ˆ et represent the sole source of individual information that motivates trade. In particular, ut
and ˆ ut play no role because they are common knowledge at the beginning of the month, so their implications
are fully reﬂected in the period-1 spot rate, s1
t. When ρ>−1, by contrast, the values of et and ut (ˆ et and ˆ ut)
are both sources of superior information to US (UK) agents because the values of ut and ˆ ut are not reﬂected
in s1
t. This means that order ﬂow innovations contain information on all four shocks, as approximated by
(33).21 As a consequence, it is not generally possible for any agent to infer the exact values of ∇et + ∇ut
by combining their individual information with their observation of period-2 order ﬂow.22 Consequently,
aggregation of dispersed information at the end of period-2 trading is incomplete.
21Importantly, it is the unexpected component of aggregate order ﬂow that conveys news – a component that is uniquely
determined. The expected component of order ﬂow is not uniquely determined, however: if agents could all coordinate in adding
some constant κ to T2
t,z, then because they are trading with one another, the resulting prices and allocations of foreign exchange
following trading would remain unchanged. (We are grateful to Eric van Wincoop for pointing out this feature of expected
order ﬂow.) As a theoretical matter, adding even inﬁnitesimal trading costs would eliminate this source of indeterminacy from
the expected component of equilibrium order ﬂow.
22An artifactual exception occurs when ρ =0 . In this case, the trades of US (UK) consumers happen to be a function of
the unweighted sum et + ut (ˆ et +ˆ ut),s oo b s e r v a t i o no fξt combined with private information could fully reveal the value of
∇et + ∇ut to all consumers. We ignore this artifactual case in the propositions that follow.














This shows that order ﬂow aggregates information from: (i) the portfolio allocation decisions of US and
UK consumers λz,t, (ii) the distribution of wealth Wt,z, (iii) the outstanding UK capital stock ˆ Kt, and (iv)
expectations of incoming order ﬂow E2
t,zT2
t,z∗. This means that order ﬂow reﬂects both individual information
about the current state, as well as other variables that aﬀect the distribution of wealth, capital stock, and
so on. In general, these additional variables are not common knowledge. Rather, they represent a source
of noise that makes precise inferences about the current state from observations of order ﬂow impossible.
This source of informational ineﬃciency is likely to occur in any model that combines dispersed information
with CRRA utility: Since CRRA asset demands depend on wealth, less-than-full information about the
distribution of wealth creates noise, more diﬃcult signal extraction, and informational ineﬃciency.
Order ﬂow ξt is the model’s key variable in terms of information transmission. Per the deﬁnition in
proposition 3, it is a reﬂection of the gap between trade initiations that agents are expecting (based on
public information) and those that actually occur, i.e., T2
t − E2
tT2
t . From (33) it is clear that in equilibrium
this one-dimensional signal is a weighted average of the underlying productivity realizations. Naturally, the
weights play a direct role in governing the degree to which uncertainty about the state remains once trading
is concluded and the order ﬂow outcome is observed.
Next we turn to period-4 trading.
Proposition 4 (Revelation Month End) After period-4 trading, information aggregation is com-
plete. In particular, the components of returns ut, ˆ ut,e t, and ˆ et are all common knowledge:











t,zdz denotes aggregate order ﬂow for pounds in period-4 trading.
When ρ>−1, period-3 spot rates cannot fully reﬂect all information relevant to the state of the economy.
This means that agents still have individual information that is relevant for forecasting returns between t:4
and t+1:1, and hence have an incentive to trade in period 4. Order ﬂow in period 4 will therefore constitute
a second signal on the underlying distribution of individual information. This signal contains incremental
information suﬃcient to reveal fully the values of ˆ ut, and ˆ et to US consumers, and the values of ut and et to
UK consumers. As a result, the values of ut, ˆ ut,e t, and ˆ et become common knowledge by the end of period-4
trading.
Two features of our model lie behind the speed of information aggregation. First, each consumer has
only to learn about a limited amount of information, namely, the values of two foreign shocks. Second, our
model makes trading very transparent because in equilibrium, incoming orders are equally divided among
21all consumers. This means that the order ﬂow received by each consumer is completely representative of
the market as a whole. This high level of transparency insures that incoming orders are only a function of
ut, ˆ ut,e t, and ˆ et in each period. Consequently, consumers can precisely infer the values of the two foreign
shocks from incoming orders in periods 2 and 4. We shall see in the next section that information does not
aggregate so quickly with less transparency.
Note, however, that proposition 4 does not imply that the exchange rate is fully revealing. Indeed, the
exchange rate in this model is never fully revealing. We have already shown that when ρ>−1,p e r i o d - 3
spot rates cannot reﬂect all information. And while agents do learn the values of ut, ˆ ut,e t, and ˆ et by the end
of period-4 trading, their quotes in period 1 of month t+1 will not fully reﬂect intervening changes in the
macro state variables ut+1, ˆ ut+1,e t+1, and ˆ et+1. Put diﬀerently, the macro-economy is evolving at a pace
that never allows asset prices to catch up fully.
We may summarize the implications of Propositions 2 through 4 as follows. For the special case where



















This information structure implies that ∇kt−1 = E3
t−1∇kt−1, E1
t∇rk







t = ∇et, so equations (30) and (31) become:
s1
t − s3
t−1 =2 θ∇et−1 + ∇ut, (35a)
s3
t − s1
t = ∇et. (35b)
T h ee x c h a n g er a t ed y n a m i c sd e s c r i b e db yt h e s ee q u a t i o n sr e ﬂect the rapid pace of information aggregation.
With perfectly correlated productivity shocks ut and ˆ ut, seeing one means seeing the other, so both are
immediately in the common-knowledge information set (i.e., at t:1). Consequently, ut and ˆ ut have an im-
mediate, one-to-one eﬀect on the period-1 spot rate. Given this, all consumers can make precise inferences
about the remaining uncertainty (the values of et and ˆ et) from their observation of period-2 order ﬂow. The
period-3 price is perfectly revealing.



















where the aggregate order ﬂow ξt now plays the central information communication role. This information
structure implies that ∇kt−1 = E3
t−1∇kt−1 + πe∇et−1 + πu∇ut−1, E1
t∇rk








22ψξt, so equations (30) and (31) become:
s1
t − s3





(πe∇et−1 + πu∇ut−1), (36)
s3
t − s1
t = ψξt. (37)
The exchange rate dynamics described here reﬂect the slower speed of information aggregation. Equation (36)
shows that ut and ˆ ut have no immediate impact on the spot rate because they are not common knowledge at
the time of their realization. Instead, dispersed information on ∇ut and ∇et becomes gradually impounded
in spot rates via the order ﬂows generated in periods 2 and 4. Impounding via period-2 order ﬂow is shown
in (37). The second term in (36) shows the eﬀect of period-4 order ﬂow.
5 Exchange Rates and Fundamentals
We now examine the implications of our model for the relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals.
For this purpose, we ﬁrst examine how real allocation decisions are aﬀected by the speed of information
aggregation. We then show how the pace of learning aﬀects the volatility of spot prices over short horizons.
Finally, we extend the model to allow for lower transparency in foreign exchange trading. This allows us to
examine the relationship between exchange rates and fundamentals over a broad range of horizons.
5.1 Embedding, Volatility, and Macro Announcements
The speed of information aggregation aﬀects real allocation decisions. In the general case with ρ>−1,
consumers make real consumption and investment decisions at the start of period 4 before the complete
state of the economy is known. This means that real allocations will be distorted by (rational) expectation
errors. In Propositions 5 and 6 below we examine the implications of these distortions for the dynamics of
fundamentals and the volatility of exchange rates.
Proposition 5 (Embedding in Fundamentals) Expectational errors are embedded in fundamentals
via the relation:












Proposition 5 shows that the monthly change in the realized distribution of capital includes two compo-
nents: the diﬀerence in capital returns ∇rk
t+1, and residual uncertainty after period-2 trading concerning the





. When ρ = −1, there is common knowledge about the full state
of the economy by period 3 and s3
t = ∇kt. Accordingly, we refer to ∇kt as identifying common-knowledge
fundamentals. In this special case, ∇kt ∈ Ω3
t, so changes in fundamentals are driven solely by the diﬀer-
23ence in capital returns. In the general case with ρ>−1, both components contribute to the dynamics of





= πe∇et + πu∇ut, so:







Thus, residual uncertainty about the distribution of capital becomes embedded in the dynamics of funda-







, so residual uncertainty creates a gap between the month t spot rate, s3
t and its fundamental
level, ∇kt, that aﬀects the international distribution of wealth. This, in turn, aﬀects exports in both the US
and UK, thereby inﬂuencing the rate of capital accumulation in both countries between month t and t +1 .
Thus, past exchange rates aﬀect the current level of fundamentals. Notice, too, that the eﬀects of residual
uncertainty are not transitory. Even though the value of past fundamentals becomes common knowledge
with just a one-month lag, eﬀects on the level of fundamentals persist indeﬁnitely: Although consumers learn
about their “consumption mistakes” once information aggregation is complete, their optimal response does
not involve immediate reversal of those mistakes.23





, the monthly depreciation

























This proposition links the speed of information aggregation to excess volatility. Recall that when ρ>−1,
consumers make real consumption and investment decisions at the start of period 4 before the complete
state of the economy is known. Proposition 5 shows how this aﬀects the dynamics of fundamentals via
expectational errors. These errors can also be a source of excess volatility. Consider the monthly rate of















Here we see that monthly changes in the exchange rate depend on current shocks, via E3
t+1∇rk
t+1, and
23This embedding eﬀect on consumption and real capital provides a natural link to the current account dynamics at the
center of new macro modeling.






. Squaring both sides of this
























































as the "fast-aggregation benchmark," since this would pin down exchange rate











< 0 (from the deﬁnition of a
variance), so the ﬁrst term on the right suggests that the lack of common knowledge should reduce volatility.
(This corresponds to the intuition–mistaken here–that less information can only translate into less price
adjustment, and therefore less volatility.) But, as the equation shows, this argument overlooks the eﬀects of
agents’ learning about past states of the economy. In our model, E3























Clearly the ﬁrst term is positive because it is proportional to the variance of forecast errors for fundamentals.
T h es e c o n dt e r mw i l la l s ob ep o s i t i v ew h e na g e n t su s einformation learned about past fundamentals to
estimate capital’s current return. The size of these terms depends on how much is learnt from period-2
trading. When period-2 order ﬂow is relatively uninformative, the πu and πe coeﬃcients will be larger
and the eﬀects of subsequent learning will contribute more to the volatility of spot rates. (Recall from
Proposition 3 that the coeﬃcients πu and πe measure the uncertainty that still remains after period-2 order
ﬂow is observed.) Proposition 6 identiﬁes a suﬃcient condition for excess volatility (i.e., πu > ¯ πu), where
the learning eﬀects dominate.
5.2 Announcements
Though enormous, the literature on macro announcements has been unsuccessful in resolving the puzzle
that lies at its center, namely, that even the most careful of event studies using the most comprehensive
announcement samples are unable to account for 5 percent of total exchange rate variation (see, e.g., Andersen
et al. 2003, Evans and Lyons 2003). Our model provides a sensible resolution: macro news will have little
impact on exchange rates if prior microeconomic aggregation is doing most of the work.
Proposition 7 (Announcements) When ρ>−1, public announcements concerning the values of rk
t
and ˆ rk
t will only aﬀect exchange rates if the announcements are made before period 4 in month t.
When the transitory capital-return shocks ut and ˆ ut have correlation greater than -1, the state of fundamen-
tals is not fully revealed until agents observe actions from period 4. Any announcement of realized capital
returns prior to that time would itself convey new information to the market, and the amount of information
25it would convey would depend on how early in the month it occurs.
If information aggregation is slower, there will of course be greater scope for announcements to impact
exchange rates. We turn now to calibrations of the model in which aggregation is slowed in a patently
realistic way: noise is introduced to the signal of marketwide order ﬂow that agents observe.
5.3 Calibration with Lowered Transparency
Though the model speciﬁcation above clariﬁes how information is impounded in analytic detail, it is not
designed to capture the full potential of learning for addressing macro issues. The extension we consider
now slows aggregation, at the expense of considerably greater analytic complexity. We solve this version of
the model numerically.
We make three modiﬁcations. Under the trading rules in our basic model, all agents received the same
ﬂow of FX orders in equilibrium, so that following trading, each could make a noiseless inference about
aggregate order ﬂow. Our ﬁrst modiﬁcation is to assume that the ﬂow of FX orders is distributed randomly
among agents quoting the same spot rate. As a result, in equilibrium each agent observes aggregate order
ﬂow at the end of each trading period with noise. Second, we allow for idiosyncratic noise in the information
each agent receives in period 1 about domestic productivity shocks. This modiﬁcation allows for dispersed
information to exist both intra- and inter-nationally. The third modiﬁcation is to add a public announcement
that fully reveals rk
t and ˆ rk
t at t+4:1; i.e., there is a delay of one quarter after trading in month t has ended
before the true state of the month-t economy is fully revealed. This latter assumption is consistent with, for
example, the fact that U.S. ﬁnal GDP announcements occur on average 4.5 months after the underlying real
activity being measured.
The reduced form of our modiﬁed model is described by:





















∇˜ et = ∇et + εe
t, (38d)
∇˜ ut = ∇ut + εu
t . (38e)
Equation (38a) combines the capital accumulation equations in (24) and (25), with the returns processes in
(8). As in Proposition 1, equation (38b) shows that the period-3 spot rate is determined by the expected
capital diﬀerential conditioned on information ˜ Ω3
t.N o t i c et h a t˜ Ω3
t diﬀers from the period-3 information set
in the basic model. We assume ˜ Ω3
t comprises the history of public announcements on past returns ∇˜ rk
t , and
the history of signals on ∇et and ∇ut, denoted by ∇˜ et and ∇˜ ut respectively. The four-month reporting lag
for public announcements is shown in (38c). The relation between the shock signals and actual shocks are
summarized by (38d) and (38e). In our basic model we constructed the counterparts to these equations by
26solving the optimal portfolio and inference problem facing each agent (see Propositions 3 and 4). Here we
model the relation in reduced form. εe
t and εu
t represent signaling noise that arises (endogenously) from the
presence of intra-nationally dispersed information on domestic productivity and the lower level of market
transparency. We assume that εe
t and εu
t are independent normally distributed mean zero random variables
with variances ˜ σ2
e and ˜ σ2
u.
We solve the modiﬁed model by guessing and verifying the form of the equilibrium estimation error for
fundamentals, ∇kt − E[∇kt|˜ Ω3
t]. To implement this numerical procedure (described in the appendix), we
parametrize the capital returns processes so the quarterly change in spot rates has a standard deviation
that matches the historical behavior for G-3 currencies over the ﬂoating-rate period. For this purpose we
set σu = σe =1 .3,θ=0 .1 and ρ =0 . These values imply that the standard deviation of quarterly spot
rate changes is approximately 6%. Our log speciﬁcation for utility implies that µ =1− β, so we set µ
equal to 1 − 0.971/12. The remaining parameters are ˜ σ2
e and ˜ σ2
u. We set ˜ σ2
e equal to (1 − κ)2σ2
e/κ and
˜ σ2
u =( 1− κ)2(1 − ρ)σ2
u/κ, where the parameter 0 ≤ κ ≤ 1 identiﬁes the signal to noise variance ratio in
both (38d) and (38e) (i.e., V[∇et]/V[∇˜ et]=V[∇ut]/V[∇˜ ut]=κ ). Low (high) values for κ imply that
agents have relatively imprecise (precise) estimates of the productively shocks based on period-2 trading.
Table 1 reports summary statistics from calibration experiments using two values for κ. In each case, the
model was solved and then simulated over 100,000 months. The table reports statistics calculated from these
simulated samples. Columns (i) and (iii) report the R2 statistic from the regression of the h−month change
in spot rates, ∆hst+h, on the h−month change in fundamentals ∆h∇kt+h ≡∇ kt+h −∇ kt.24 Columns (ii)
and (iv) report the variance ratio for ∆hst+h relative to ∆h∇kt+h.
The results in Table 1 display two important features. First, the slower pace of learning almost completely
masks the link between spot rate changes and changing fundamentals over horizons of one year or less
(consistent with the well known results of Meese and Rogoﬀ 1983). In particular, the R2 statistics columns
(i) and (iii) are less than 20% for h<12. Intuitively, spot rates are being driven by order ﬂow that changes
estimated fundamentals ∆hE[∇kt|˜ Ω3
t], but the process by which information is aggregated makes actual
∆h∇kt av e r yp o o rp r o x yf o r∆hE[∇kt|˜ Ω3
t] at high frequencies. At low frequencies, where the change in
fundamentals is measured over many years, ∆h∇kt is much more closely correlated with ∆hE[∇kt|˜ Ω3
t],s o
the link between exchange rates and fundamentals appears as higher R2 statistics.
The second noteworthy feature of Table 1 concerns volatility. Even though the complete state of fun-
damentals is known with a four-month reporting lag, the eﬀects of incomplete information have signiﬁcant
impact on volatility at much lower frequencies: the variance ratios (reported in columns ii and iv) are ap-
proximately 1.3 at the h =1 2month horizon. In sum, the eﬀects of learning on volatility extend well beyond
the horizon at which learning about fundamentals is complete. Notice, also, that there is little diﬀerence
between the results based on κ =0 .5 where market transparency comparatively low, and those based on
24The results in columns (i) and (iii) represent an upper bound on the R2 statistics we could expect to ﬁnd in empirical
applications because they are computed under the assumption that data on actual fundamentals is available. In reality, a
researcher may only have access to a subset of the variables that comprise fundamentals.
27Table 1: Calibration Results
Experiment I Experiment II
κ =0 .5 κ =0 .99










(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
1 0.001 4.516 0.003 2.791
2 0.080 2.598 0.116 1.818
3 0.041 2.034 0.057 1.527
4 0.020 2.170 0.026 1.789
5 0.011 1.953 0.014 1.658
6 0.001 1.787 0.001 1.546
12 0.200 1.387 0.214 1.270
24 0.492 1.192 0.508 1.135
36 0.632 1.127 0.649 1.090
48 0.713 1.094 0.727 1.067
60 0.763 1.076 0.776 1.054
120 0.876 1.037 0.883 1.027
κ =0 .99 where transparency is quite high. A small degree of residual uncertainty appears suﬃcient to
de-couple changes in spot rates and fundamentals at high frequency.25
To summarize, our calibrated model not only delivers a quantitative account for the determination puzzle,
it does so in a way consistent with another important stylized fact–that order ﬂows can account for monthly
exchange rate changes. Our results, both analytic and simulated, show that the pace of aggregation is central
to exchange rate dynamics. Importantly, our results do not depend on information aggregation being slow
in any absolute sense: to have long-lasting eﬀects on both fundamentals and exchange rates, the pace of
aggregation need only be slow enough to aﬀect real decisions. Moreover, to get slow aggregation in the
model, it is not the case that conditions have to be special; rather, slow aggregation is the general case, and
fast aggregation the special case. The learning that is occurring here is diﬀerent from the symmetric learning
that occurs elsewhere in international macroeconomics. In symmetric learning models, the time when (all)
agents learn something is exogenous, e.g., the arrival of a macroeconomic announcement. Here, the timing
of learning is endogenous–it depends on the actions of private agents.
25For perspective on this result, consider the problem of estimating zt from noisy observations ˜ ηt, = ηt +  t, where ηt ∼
N(0,σ2
η),  t ∼ N(0,σ2
 ), and ∆zt = ηt. It is straightforward to show that the estimation errors zer





follow a random walk ∆zer
t = κ˜ ηt where κ>0 for any σ2
  > 0. Thus, the sample standard deviation of zer
t increases with
the sample size whenever there is any noise in the ηt signal. Our model has a similar knife-edge property: Although the
fundamentals’ estimation errors ∇kt −E[∇kt|˜ Ω3
t] are stationary because agents learn the true value for ∇kt after four months,
the presence of any noise in the signaling equations (38d) and (38e) induces a large amount of volatility in ∇kt − E[∇kt|˜ Ω3
t].
286C o n c l u s i o n
Our new micro model of exchange rates connects the DGE and microstructure approaches. A challenge for
past DGE models is ﬁnding more traction in the data. Our results suggest that enriching their information
structure (as opposed to their preference or production structures) may provide that traction. The shortcom-
ings of microstructure modeling are more on the theoretical side: these models warrant a richer placement
within the underlying real economy if they are to realize their potential for addressing macro phenomena.
This joint need is what motivates our paper.
DGE analysis highlights several implications of dispersed information that are not evident in partial
equilibrium analysis. First, though the timing of information receipt is exogenous, the timing of impounding
in price is endogenous. This is because the market signals that lead to that impounding are themselves
endogenous (e.g., the signals in agents’ decision to trade). Second, DGE modeling of price discovery shows
that real decisions are aﬀected, with the degree depending on the pace of endogenous revelation. Accordingly,
in a DGE setting such as this, one can address questions such as, What is the welfare-optimal pace of
revelation? (It is well known that fast revelation may not be optimal because, for example, it can impede
risk sharing.) Third, the information structure of the DGE model provides needed clarity on why transaction
eﬀects on exchange rates should persist and, importantly, whether that persistence applies to real exchange
rates or only to nominal rates. Persistence will apply to real exchange rates if, for example, signed transaction
ﬂow is conveying information about underlying shocks that are themselves both real and persistent.
We use the new framework to address the determination puzzle–that monthly exchange rates are not
well explained by fundamentals empirically. Four analytical results include: (1) persistent gaps between ex-
change rates and fundamentals, (2) excess volatility relative to fundamentals, (3) exchange rate movements
without macro news, and (4) little or no exchange rate movement when macro news occurs. Important
for understanding all of these is the fact that the underlying state of fundamentals–the union of all infor-
mation sets–is revealed only gradually. Meantime, real allocations are distorted by (rational) expectation
errors, which induce additional exchange rate volatility. Calibration shows that this mechanism induces the
propagation of micro-based learning eﬀects to exchange rate dynamics at macro-relevant frequencies.
Our calibrated model not only delivers a quantitative account for the determination puzzle, it also
accounts for why monthly exchange rate changes can be explained by order ﬂow. When dispersed information
is present, aggregate order ﬂows provide a stronger signal of current and expected future changes macro
fundamentals than lagged macro variables do. But is dispersed information actually present? Dispersed
information characterizes most variables at the center of exchange rate modeling, including output, money
demand, inﬂation, consumption preferences, and risk preferences. These variables are not realized at the
macro level, but rather at the micro level, with macro aggregations provided by oﬃcial institutions only for
a subset of these, and even then only with considerable lags. Some of this information is clearly aggregated
by markets. These ideas are borne out in recent empirical ﬁndings (Evans and Lyons 2004b,2005): order
ﬂows do indeed help to forecast future changes in macro fundamentals, and in fact do a much better job
29than the spot rate itself.
This paper is a ﬁrst venture in an unexplored direction. We view it as the natural direction for syn-
thesizing the microstructure and DGE-macro approachest oe x c h a n g er a t e s .T om i c r o s t r u c t u r e - b a s e dw o r k ,
the synthesis brings discipline and real-economy insights. To macro DGE modeling, it brings information-
structure realism and an ability to account for exchange rates empirically.
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33AA p p e n d i x
This appendix includes three sections. The ﬁrst is the longest–it describes the model’s solution and presents
proofs of Propositions 1-7. The second addresses market clearing conditions. The third describes the
numerical solution to the extended model used for calibration.
A.1 Solving the Model
A.1.1 Conjectured Equilibrium
There are three parts to the conjectured equilibrium: (1) the evolution of the exchange rate and interest
rate, (2) the evolution of information sets, and (3) the form of the decision rules.
Equilibrium exchange rates and interest rates are conjectured to follow (ρ>−1 and ρ 6=0 ):
s1
t+1 − s3





(πe∇et + πu∇ut), (39)
s3
t − s1
t = ψξt, (40)
rt = r + ηξt, (41)
ˆ rt = r − ηξt, (42)









t−1 is the scaled innovation in period-2 order ﬂow (relative to Ω2
t) that
depends on all four return shocks:
ξt ∼ = ξe∇et + ξu∇ut. (43)
The πi and ξi coeﬃcients are related by πi =( 1− ψξi) 6=0 .















































t,z is the order ﬂow innovation received by consumer z in period-2
trading (z = {US,UK}). (Hereafter, we use Xt,US to denote Xt,z for z<1/2, and Xt,UK = Xt,z for z ≥ 1/2
for any variable X.)
















































where Σε is the (exogenous) unconditional covariance
of εt.
Decision rules for portfolio shares and log consumption-wealth ratios are conjectured to take the form:
λt,z = λz + λ
0
zεt (48)
ωt,z = ωz + ω0
zεt (49)
δt,z = δz + δ
0
zεt (50)
where ωt,z is introduced here to summarize the two period-4 portfolio decisions, i.e., ω0
t,US ≡ [ αt,US γt,US ]
and ω0
t,UK ≡ [ αt,UK − γt,UK γt,UK ].λ z,ω z and δz are 4×1 vectors of coeﬃcients, while λz,ω z and δz are
constants.
1.1.2 Veriﬁcation
Decision Rule Veriﬁcation: We start by verifying the third part of the conjectured equilibrium–the
form of the decision rules in (48)—(50). That these decision rules take this convenient linear form is not
surprising given the model’s log-linear structure. Nevertheless, it is important to show this rigorously, given
the obvious signiﬁcance of these rules for constructing equilibrium. The derivation is somewhat tedious,
however, and conveys little insight by itself. Accordingly, we refer readers to the derivation in our working
paper, Evans and Lyons (2004a), pages A2-A5.
Before we proceed, however, there are two results from the derivation just noted that warrant mention.
The ﬁrst relates to the wedge in the decision problems that captures the risk in liquidity provision, φt,z .
In particular, it is constant over time and equal across agents, i.e., φt,z = φ. Constancy is a reﬂection of
the ergodic structure of the model at the monthly frequency: the risk inherent in liquidity provision is not
2varying from month to month. Equality across agents reﬂects the symmetry in conditional second moments
that agents are facing when solving their liquidity-provision problem. The second noteworthy result is an

















This will be useful below.
Information Structure Veriﬁcation: Now we verify the second part of the conjectured equilibrium–the
evolution of information sets. To set the stage, note that at the start of period 1 consumers observe home
productivity shocks so that {et,u t} ∈ Ω2
t,US and {ˆ et, ˆ ut} ∈ Ω2
t,UK. Expectations of the productivity shocks




















.ε t,z denotes the vector of

















with ιUS ≡ (ι1 + ι3) and ιUK ≡ (ι1 + ι3), as shown in equation (46) where the superscript i in (46) is set to
1.
We proceed by characterizing this expectation for successive values of bi
z , i = {1,2,3,4}. Since no new
information arrives during period 1, Ω2
t,z = Ω1
t,z and hence b1
z = b2
z.Speciﬁcally, (46) implies that E2
t,USˆ et =
E2
t,UKet =0 , E2
t,USˆ ut = ρut and E2
t,UKut = ρˆ ut. For the public information described by (47), since the
















This is the form of (47) with bi =0for i = {1,2}.
Next, we consider the information that accrues between the start of periods 2 and 3, i.e., the i =3case.



















t,zdz, with the deﬁnitions of T2
t and the target














































is world-wide wealth. Bond-market clearing implies that W2
t−1 = S1
t−1 ˆ Kt−1 + Kt−1,w h i c ha c c o r d i n gt ot h e
conjectured information structure in (45) is common-knowledge at t:1 (i.e., W2
t−1 ∈ Ω1
t).W em a yt h e r e f o r e






. Substituting for T2


















































































































Recall that bond-market clearing implies that Wi
t,US + Wi
t,UK = Kt + S
i−1
t ˆ Kt, or:
wi













for i = {1,3}. Approximating the right hand side around the steady state gives,
wi
t,US − kt ∼ = s
i−1
t + ˆ kt − wi
t,UK, (54)


















Substituting for λt,US and λt,UK with expressions derived in Evans and Lyons (2004b) for establishing the















where λe = ψξe/σ2
s and λu = ψξu(1 − ρ)/σ2
s. Substituting for s1


















4To determine the expectations terms, E2
t,USξt and E2
t,UKξt, we guess and verify that ξt =  e∇et+ e∇ut for
some coeﬃcients  i. Under our information structure, this guess implies that E2
t,USξt =  eet+ u (1 − ρ)ut
and E2














∼ = ξe∇et + ξu∇ut = ξ
0εt,
as shown in (43).
Inferences about the vector of productivity shocks based on Ω3








































We thus have our expression for (47) with i =3 .
Turning to the i =4case, inferences about the productivity shocks based on Ω4
t,z are calculated as






ξt,z denote the re-scaled unexpected order ﬂow consumer z received
during period-2 trading. Since W2
t,z/βRW2
t−1 ∈ Ω1
t,z, we can use ˜ ξt,z to represent individual information
accruing to consumer z between the start of periods 2 and 4. (Since period-3 spot rates are a function of
Ω3
t, no new individual information accrues between the start of periods 3 and 4.) Combining the deﬁnitions
















Using (45) to evaluate the expectations terms on the right, we ﬁnd that
˜ ξt,US ∼ = −ξeˆ et + ξu (ρut − ˆ ut)=˜ ξ
0
USεt, (60)
˜ ξt,UK ∼ = ξeet + ξu (ut − ρˆ ut)=˜ ξ
0
UKεt. (61)









































































































We thus have our expression for equation (46) when i =4 .
We turn back now to i =1 , i.e., we examine the information revealed by order ﬂow at the end of
the month in period-4. As in period 2, all consumers receive the same incoming orders in equilibrium, so


















t,zdz, with the deﬁnitions of
T4




























t in this deﬁnition, linearizing around the steady state (where αt,z = αz =( 1− µ)/2, δt,z =0 ,W2
t,US = Kt,
W2
t,UK = ˆ Kt,a n dS3
t = Kt/ ˆ Kt), and combining this with (54) for i =4 ,w eﬁnd that:
ςt = 1
2 (αt,US − αUS)+1
2 (αt,UK − αUK)
+
µ







Substituting for ∇kt − s3





















where αt,z ≡  zωt,z. As above, we solve this equation with the guess and verify method using (46) to give:
ςt ∼ = Φeet + Φˆ eˆ et + Φuut + Φˆ uˆ ut. (63)


































with Φ ≡ [ Φe Φˆ e Φu Φˆ u ].
To solve for the information revealed by period-4 trading, we need to identify the unexpected order ﬂows
received by each consumer in period-4, as well as the unexpected export orders. Innovations in period-4









. Taking a log-linear approximation around
the steady state values of W2
t−1,W4







. Combining this approximation


























The ﬁnal step in verifying the conjectured information sets is to show how (58) and (63) can be combined
with elements of Ω4





for z = {US,UK}. For the case of US consumers,
we rewrite (58) and (63) as:
χ2
t,US ≡ ξt − ξeet − ξuut = −ξeˆ et − ξuˆ ut,
χ4
t,US ≡ ςt − Φeet − Φuut = Φˆ eˆ et + Φˆ uˆ ut.
χ2
t,US and χ4
t,US provide two signals of the values of ˆ et and ˆ ut that can be constructed from information























ˆ ut = −
µ
1







Similarly, UK consumers can combine their observations of order ﬂow from periods 2 and 4 with their
knowledge of ˆ ut and ˆ et to infer the values of et and ut precisely. Thus, {et, ˆ et,u t, ˆ ut} are indeed common
knowledge after period-4 trading. This completes the veriﬁcation of the information structure shown in
(44)—(47).
Exchange and Interest Rate Process Veriﬁcation: The last step in verifying the equilibrium concerns
the conjectured processes for the exchange rate and interest rate. First we verify that the processes for
equilibrium quotes made in periods 1 and 3 follow (39)—(42). To derive the exchange rate process, we start
by combining the capital accumulation equations, (24) and (25), to give:










Combining this equation with the identity s3






t −∇ kt gives:
s3










































. Substituting this expression
















This establishes an important equation; it corresponds to (29) in the text.



























































for i>1 by iterated expectations, the expression



































































Applying the conditional expectations operator E1




































t. Notice that this restriction follows as an implication of market clearing and rational
expectations (it does not rely on any approximations). As such, it must hold true for any equilibrium
distribution of wealth, including the case where Wt,US = Wt,UK = S1
t ˆ Kt ∈ Ω1
t. Under these circumstances,
























































































=0 . Notice that we would not be able to derive this
simple implication of rational expectations and market clearing if hedging terms were present in the period-2








=0with (70) gives us the equilibrium exchange rate quoted




Equilibrium exchange rate dynamics are derived by combining (70) and (72) with (67). For this purpose,
we take expectations conditioned on Ω1


























































(st−1 −∇ kt−1) − E3
t [st−1 −∇ kt−1]
¢
.
Under our information structure, {st−1,∇kt−1,∇et−1} ∈ Ω3
t, so this expression simpliﬁes to:
∇kt − E3















with ı ≡ [ 1 −11−1 ]. T h ef o r mo ft h eπi coeﬃcients
follow from (59) and (43). Combining (74), (73) and the fact that E1
t+1∇rk










9Thus, we have established the ﬁrst of our conjectured exchange rate equations in (39).
To derive the second of our two exchange rate equations in (40), we take expectations conditioned on Ω3
t
































































[∇et + ∇ut].S i n c eE1
tεt =0 , the latter term simpliﬁes to E3
t [∇et + ∇ut]. Now (59) and (43) imply
that E3
t [∇et + ∇ut]=ıK3ξt. Combining these results with the equation above gives:
s3
t − s1
t = ıK3ξt = ψξt,
as shown in (40).
As a side point, we can use (73) and (67) to calculate the value of s1
t −∇ kt used in the derivation of
period-2 order ﬂow above. Speciﬁcally, by combining (73) and (67) we can write:
s1
















According to the conjectured information structure in (45), ∇kt−1 and ∇et−1 are common knowledge by t:1,
i.e., {∇kt−1,∇et−1} ∈ Ω1







t = −∇et −∇ut. Substituting these results into the equation above gives the value
used in the derivation:
s1
t −∇ kt = −∇et −∇ ut. (76)
Finally, we turn to the interest rate quotes made in period 3. From (64), (65) and (66) we see that
innovations to period-4 order ﬂow, ςt,z, and exports, ζt,US and ˆ ζt,UK, depend on the choices for ωt,z and δt,z
made at the start of the period. This means that ωt,z and δt,z cannot be functions of Ω3
t,o t h e r w i s eςt,z,ζ t,US
and ˆ ζt,UK would not be orthogonal to Ω3
t as rational expectations requires. For this to be the case, expected
excess returns on capital cannot be correlated with elements of Ω3
t. Thus, market clearing requires that the




ˆ rt = E3
tˆ rk
t+1. (78)
10Given the process for capital returns, and the conjecture information structure, these equations become
r = r + θE3
t∇et
= r + θ(ι1 − ι2)K3ξt, (79)
ˆ r = r − θE3
t∇et
= r − θ(ι1 − ι2)K3ξt, (80)
where K3 is deﬁned in (59). Equations (79) and (80) take the same form as the last two of the conjectured
process equations we set out to verify, namely (41) and (42), in this case with η = θ(ι1 − ι2)K3.
Investment and Idiosyncratic Export Shocks: To show how investment expenditures depend on the
idiosyncratic components of last month’s export shock, we ﬁrst note from (49) and (50) that the values of ωt,z
and δt,z are the same for all agents within each country. Next, notice from (??), (??)a n d( ??)t h a te x p o r t















neither term depends on the idiosyncratic components of the export shocks, these shocks have a negligible
(i.e. 3rd order) eﬀect on the distribution of wealth within a country. Together, these observations imply
that period-4 investment decisions are made so that Kt,z + It,z = Kt and ˆ Kt,z + ˆ It,z = ˆ Kt where Kt (ˆ Kt)i s
the same across US (UK) agents. Aggregating each of these expressions, and imposing the market clearing
condition, implies that Kt = Kt and ˆ Kt = ˆ Kt. Combining these results with (6) and (7) and the aggregate
capital dynamics in (22) and (23) gives:
It,z = Kt − Kt,z = Rk
tνt−1,z,,
ˆ It,z = ˆ Kt − ˆ Kt,z = ˆ Rk
t ˆ νt−1,z.
Thus, in equilibrium, each US (UK) agent chooses real investment to oﬀset the eﬀects of the idiosyncratic
component of last month’s export shock.
1.1.3 Equilibrium when ρ = −1
When ρ = −1, equilibrium interest rates and the exchange rate follow:
s1
t+1 − s3
t = ∇ut+1 +2 θ∇et, (81)
s3
t − s1
t = ∇et, (82)
rt = r + θ∇et, (83)
ˆ rt = r − θ∇et, (84)




















































Unexpected order ﬂow in period-2 is perfectly correlated with ∇et, while order ﬂows in period 4 are perfectly




















The consumption-wealth ratio and period-4 portfolio shares are constant.
We can verify that these equations describe the equilibrium following the veriﬁcation procedure in the
general case. In this special case things are much simpler, so we only outline the argument. Start with
the observation that {ut, ˆ ut} ∈ Ω1
t because the “u” shocks are perfectly (negatively) correlated. Thus, the
“e” shocks are the only source of individual information at the start of period-2 trading. In equilibrium,
consumers use this information in choosing their desired portfolio, as (87) shows, with the result that the





for all z,s ot h e“ e”s h o c k s
become common knowledge by the start of period 3. This means that E3










t = ∇et. Substituting these results into (73) and (75) gives (81) and (82). The information
structure also implies that E3
trk
t+1 = θ∇et and E3
tˆ rk
t+1 = −θ∇et, so (83) and (84) follow from (77) and (78).
All that now remains is to verify the form of the decision rules. (81) — (85) imply that the vector of expected
excess returns E4
t,zxt+1,z is zero. Under these circumstances, ωt,z and δt,z are constant (details in Evans and
Lyons 2004b, pages A3-A4). Equation (87) follows from (82), (??), and the linearized ﬁrst-order condition
for λt,z.
1.1.4 Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1 (Spot Rates): See the text following (29).
Proposition 2 (Revelation in a Special Case): See the text following the proposition.
Proposition 3 (Revelation in the General Case):
The only part of the proposition not covered in section 1.1.2 concerns the values of the updating coeﬃ-
cients πe and πu. We argue by contradiction to show that πe 6=0and πu 6=0 .I fπe =( 1− ψξe)=0and



















λu =( 1 − ρ)
¡
σ2




Combining these expressions with the equation above gives
¡
σ2
e +( 1− ρ2)σ2
u
¢
= −4; a contradiction.
Proposition 4 (Revelation at Month End): This proposition is proved within the Veriﬁcation subsec-
tion of Appendix section A.1.
Proposition 5 (Embedding): The equation in this proposition is a simple combination of the results in
(67) and (70).
Proposition 6 (Excess Volatility): The ﬁrst variance expression follows directly from the capital returns
processes (8a) and (8b), and the exchange rate equations (81) and (82). To derive the second expression,
combine (39) and (40) to give:
∆s3






Substituting for ξt+1 with (43) yields:
∆s3






= ψξe∇et+1 + ψξu∇ut+1 + ∇rk












































































Note that ¯ πu < 1 because 1 >µ>0, so ¯ πu is the lower bound on πu suﬃcient to generate excess volatility.
13Proposition 7 (Announcements):







for i = {1,3}, where Ωi
t denotes public information at t:i identiﬁed in (45) without announcements. Thus,
a public announcement about the values of rk
t and ˆ rk










t , ˆ rk
t
¤
. Since ∇kt ∈ Ω1
t+1, announcements made after t:4 have no exchange rate
eﬀects because all the information they contain has been aggregated by consumers via trading.
Suppose the announcement is made in t:3. Equation (74) implies that ∇kt = E3
t∇kt + πe∇et + πu∇ut,




















= πe∇et + πu∇ut.




t = ψξt +( πe∇et + πu∇ut).













= ∇kt − E
h
∇rk











= ∇et + ∇ut.
The model is well suited to address important issues within the literature, including: (1) market in-
completeness and its implications, (2) the informational distinction between "order ﬂows" and "portfolio
ﬂows"–the latter being prevalent in the macro literature, and (3) the causes and consequences of enormous
trading volume in FX markets. For analysis of these and other issues, see the working paper version of this
paper (Evans and Lyons 2004a).
1.2 Market Clearing Conditions











t,UK − Ct,UK)=0 .









t,UK − It,US =0 .








t,z∗dz∗, this condition implies that
It,US =0 . Imposing this restriction on the overnight dynamics of US capital gives (22). Similarly, market




t,z∗ − ˆ Ct,US)+(ˆ B1
t,UK + T4
t,UK − T4





t,z∗ − ˆ It,US
= −ˆ It,US.
Imposing ˆ It,UK =0on the overnight dynamics of UK capital gives (23).
1.3 Solving the Modiﬁed Model
To solve the modiﬁed model, we ﬁrst combine (24) and (25) to write fundamentals as a function of past
capital returns and spot rates. Assuming that capital is equally distributed between the US and UK in














Lagging this equation by four periods, and taking expectations conditional on ˜ Ω3






. Thus, the announced value for ∇rk
t−4 at t:1 combined with the information in ˜ Ω3
t−1 reveals
the true value of ∇kt−4. We incorporate this informational implication of the modiﬁed model by substituting:
∇˜ kt = ∇kt−4 (88)








Next, we write the estimation error for fundamentals ∇kerr
t ≡∇ kt − E[∇kt|˜ Ω3
t] as a linear function of
variables that characterize the true state at month t but are not elements in Ω3
t. In particular, we posit that:
∇kerr
t = β0∇kerr
t−1 + β1∇et + β2∇ut + β3εe
t + β4εu
t
+β5∇et−1 + β6∇ut−1 + β7εe
t−1 + β8εu
t−1
+β9∆∇kt−1 + β10∆∇kt−2 + β11∆∇kt−3. (89)
for some undetermined coeﬃcients βi. Note that (89) imposes the restriction that fundamentals errors follow
a stationary process.
We can now write the dynamics of the modiﬁed model (i.e. equations (38a), (38b), (38d), (38e), (88) and
(89)) in state space form:
Xt+1 = AXt + BUt (90)






















∇˜ et ∇˜ ut ∇˜ kt
i
.
Xt is the (unobserved) state vector for model and Yt identiﬁes the vector of signals observed at t:1. Notice
also that the ﬁrst rows of the A and B matrices contain the unknown coeﬃcients βi. Hence (90) and
(91) summarize the dynamics of the modiﬁed model given a conjecture about the estimation error for
fundamentals.
To ﬁnd the equilibrium values for the βi coeﬃcients, we note that CV
h
∇kerr









for any variable zt. We use this moment restriction to ﬁnd the values for the βi as follows: First, we apply
the Kalman ﬁltering algorithm to (90) and (91) for a given set of βi coeﬃcients. This yields the following
recursion:
St+1 = A(I−KtC)StA0 + BWB0,





and Kt = StC0(CStC0)−1. Starting with St=0 = I10, we iterate on this recursion
until there is no change in the gain matrix, say at t = τ. (The form of the C matrix in our model insures
that Kt always converges to a constant matrix K) At this point we compare the ﬁrst two columns of Sτ+1 =
A(I−KC)SτA0 + BWB0. If all the entries match, then CV
h
∇kerr








for zt equal to
each element of Xt a n dw eh a v eas o l u t i o nt ot h em o d e l .I np r a c t i c ew eﬁnd the equilibrium values for the βi
by minimizing a quadratic form in the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst two columns of Sτ+1. Once these values
are found, we can identify spot rates as st = E[∇kt|˜ Ω3
t] ≡∇ kt −∇ kerr
t .
16